

Towards Re-Securitization of Water in the New Middle East¹

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SUMMARY

The New World Order and climate change effects may shift hydro-politics paradigm from (de)securitization to re-securitization in conflicted areas. While World was changing in international relationship rapidly, little attention has been paid to risk of re-securitization of some issues by related communities.

This paper first reviews possible effects of the natural climate changing trends together with consequences of the new world political changing trends on trans boundary rivers hydro-politics in post conflicted regions. It also discusses the ongoing changing in natural climate and international political climate effects on transboundary water management in relation to securitization theory. It then unpacks the nexus water re-securitization through the prism of the national state turn in New World Order. We aim to address the risk of water re-securitization within the issue area of conceptualizing a New World Order emerging on the base of new national states concept.

We conduct a conceptual scoping, which critically probes what re-securitization and conflicts change politically in the conflicted regions where water was securitized while major peacebuilding efforts have been made to de-securitize the conflict in the past.

We conclude with a discussion of the risk of re-politicizing water conflict dynamics can gain momentum and threaten the regional security in the water conflicted regions. It directly contradicts the normative assumption about de-securitization as a return to normal politics.

Keywords: De-securitization, Re-securitization , Water Politics ; Conflict;
Water conflict;New Middle East; Conflict analysis

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1.INTRODUCTION

In the post-cold war period the traditional military threats, territorial integrity and state sovereignty based security paradigm was challenged leading to the elaboration of a broader conceptualization of security.

This article discusses and amends risk of re-securitization of some issues in relation with the new international relationships and national interest politics. New international relationship and new world order concepts may permit securitization of some issues by states and some actors other than the state,

In general, the post-Cold War desecuritisation of Russia and its subsequent resecuritisation following the annexation of Crimea. Can be taken as a recent example. The implications of resecuritisation for the emergence of a self-reinforcing security dilemma in NATO-Russia relations are also considered.

Some possible cases of re-securitization are presented and then it is evaluated from the post-Cold War securitization to possible re-securitization approach following the change in state borders and emerging conflicts potential in 21st Century.

It is obvious that technical framing of conflict tends to result in depoliticized outcomes and ignores the underlying causes of conflict. As a consequence, “new” peacemakers in the form of water experts and development brokers have specialized knowledge and thus speak with authority, but their powers are rarely assessed. The diplomats turn from peacebuilding practices may empower certain actors, who act as the harsh national interest saver while peacemakers are marginalized.

The implications of re-securitization for the emergence of a self-reinforcing security dilemma in new international relations are also worth-considered.

Therefore, it is worth nothing to draw upon two strands of research: new security architecture and transboundary water management examining below mentioned core questions:

How is re-securitization understood within the context of water conflict and what will be the influences of new security paradigm and new more nationalistic approach in resolving new water conflicts and building water peace?

2.WHAT IS THE NEW WORLD ORDER (NWO)?

The New World Order is something that various politicians and other elitists have been referring to for several years. The New World Order or NWO is claimed to be an emerging clandestine totalitarian world government by various conspiracy theories (18,19,20,21,22).

The New World order is the supposed goal of a handful of global elitists who are pushing for a one world government and a heightened national security state.

The common theme in conspiracy theories about a New World Order is that a secretive power elite with a globalist agenda is conspiring to eventually rule the world through an authoritarian world government—which will replace sovereign nation-states—and an all-encompassing propaganda whose ideology hails the establishment of the New World Order as the culmination of history's progress. Many influential historical and contemporary figures have therefore been purported to be part of a cabal that operates through many front organizations to orchestrate significant political and financial events, ranging from causing systemic crises to pushing through controversial policies, at both national and international levels, as steps in an ongoing plot to achieve world domination. (18,19,20,21,22).

Before the early 1990s, New World Order conspiracism was limited to two American countercultures, primarily the militantly anti-government right and secondarily that part of Skeptics such as Michael Barkun and Chip Berlet observed that right-wing populist conspiracy theories about a New World Order had not only been embraced by many seekers of stigmatized knowledge but had seeped into popular culture, thereby inaugurating a period during the late 20th and early 21st centuries in the United States where people are actively preparing for apocalyptic millenarian scenarios.(19,21) Those political scientists are concerned that mass hysteria over New World Order conspiracy theories could eventually have devastating effects on American political life, ranging from escalating lone-wolf terrorism to the rise to power of authoritarian ultranationalist demagogues.(19,21, 23).

2.1. The New World Order (!) and More Nationalistic Politics

International politics for most of the past quarter century was relatively straightforward. The United States reigned supreme, with no other nation coming even close economically or militarily. Under its aegis, globalization flourished, and conflicts were relatively confined in scope. Politics seemed to have become secondary.

Why any nation would want to throw out its sovereignty to institutions that are fundamentally unaccountable, that provide no mechanism for reversing direction, and whose only "solution" to problems involves arrogating to itself ever more authoritarian, rather than democratically legitimate, power. (16).

According to some experts such as Prof Michael A. Witt who is an Affiliate Professor of Strategy and International Business. **“With globalization on the ropes and a hegemon in decline, prevalent political science theories suggest a conflictual future.”** (16).

While globalization is still alive, the **prognosis is not favorable**. In addition, China's re-emergence means that for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has to contend with another player in its league. China now has the world's largest economy and its **third-most capable military**. If it grows much further – admittedly not a foregone conclusion – it may replace the U.S. as the world's predominant power.

What does this new landscape of two major Powers mean for the future of world politics? In particular, are China and the U.S. likely to rub along, albeit with some friction? Or is there a risk of major conflict or even war? (16).

2.2. Realism

Realism looks back on a long intellectual history, in **China** and the **West**. It remains the dominant paradigm of international politics today (16).

The predictions of realism derive from its view of the international system as ultimately anarchic and based on self-help. In this view, there are no credible rules that prevent other, more powerful states from seizing weaker ones. While rules do seem to exist – for instance, in the shape of the United Nations – they are seen as derivative of the power of one or several states that can ensure compliance. Sometimes this works, as in the case of the first Iraq War. Often it does not.

This means states need to be concerned with securing their own survival against outside aggression. In realist logic, survival is likely if there is a balance of power: both sides of a possible conflict are equally strong. Under the crucial assumption of rationality, neither side will attack the other under these conditions. So, survival requires building up a military strong enough to counter any threats – if necessary, with the help of allies – and an economy large enough to support the requisite military expenses (16).

2.3. Europe, USA, China, Russia

From Europe's perspective, the world in 2017 looks very different to how it looked just one year ago. But despite significant upsets resulting from elections and/or referendums, not all of the changes that are taking place are breaks from previously-trodden paths. Some are continuations of previous trends that have now become more visible or more entrenched.

One major trend, which started some 20 years ago, is the diminishing relative economic importance of advanced countries. This trend became evident around 2010, when advanced countries started to account for less than half of global GDP in purchasing power terms(17).

In the case of the United States this trend emerged during the Clinton administration (1993-2001), when the question of "*what's in it for us?*" first arose in terms of "*regaining competitiveness*". Donald Trump's victory in November 2016 seems to have made this principle into the underpinning of all the new administration's policies.

The European Union remains unsure about its role in the world, not least in terms of its security and its ability to do new trade deals. Brexit will diminish the EU's size and possibly its trade and security influence.

By contrast, China's position in the world has strengthened during the last 20-25 years. President Xi Jinping's speech in Davos in January 2017 was more like that of a 'growing giant' and reminiscent of presidents' speeches calling for an open global economic system during the heyday of US hegemony.(17)

Finally, the EU remains a weaker player than its size suggests, not only because of its internal divisions but also because of its dependence on the security guarantee that the US provides and its dependence on energy imports. How and whether the EU and its member states address these two concerns is a crucial subject that goes beyond the scope of this paper.

Putin is rethinking of strategic alliances in South Asia and Moscow's role in Syrian Crisis has brought it enough support from Middle East to govern the world affairs. Russia's military power, as well as improving economic power, indicates Kremlin's growing influence on world affairs.

Often 21st century is regarded as Chinese century due to Beijing's growing relative economic power and military power. China is leasing out world's major economic corridors to access markets and it is making its grip stronger on the global arena by incorporating manufacturing industry.

3.SECURITIZATION AND TYPES OF IT

According to Oelsner (37), security is the realm where emergency measures beyond ordinary political procedures become permissible. When an issue makes it into the sphere of security because it has been successfully presented as a threat, it has been securitised. In other words, securitisation is the process by which a *securitising actor* succeeds in presenting a threat or vulnerability as an *existential threat* to a *referent object* that has a legitimate claim to survival, thereby attaining endorsement for *emergency measures*.

The emphasis on violence still allows for a wide range of threats, referent objects and actors. For instance, in the 1970s the River Paraná's water resources became a security issue between Argentina and Brazil, since both sides contemplated the violent option in order to solve the issue. The concrete and explicit dispute was not about borders, arms balances, identities or ideologies. Rather, it simply regarded the capacity of the Brazilian dam, which was being built upstream, and whether or not it would affect Argentina's projected dam, to be built downstream.⁸ In the eyes of Argentine geopoliticians, the potential consequences of Brazil establishing the dam's capacity too high would range from floods to droughts to the spread of diseases. In the eyes of Brazilian geopoliticians, Argentines just wanted to slow down the speed of their industrial and economic growth, for which this dam was crucial(37).

If this issue were to be located in a security sector, it would be either the environmental (as it was about natural resources) or the economic sector (as the dams were for the production of hydroelectric energy needed for industrial development). What made it a security matter—regardless of in which security sector—was that securitising actors presented the issue as so dangerous and important that they received endorsement by the audience (in this case, political, military, and some segments of the scientific elites, since both states were ruled by authoritarian regimes that left little space for public opinion) to resort to violence, if necessary(37).

Securitization has increasingly become established within the broader and more general fields of International Relations and security studies.

Oelsner discussed the definition of security in her article saying that it is as socially constructed implies that it is not simply about a subjective perception of threats; it is not a matter that individuals decide alone, but rather has an intersubjective character. Consequently, the actual content of the concept of security is built up by the securitizing actor in a delicate bargaining process with the legitimizing audience on the grounds of facts (37).

Once these facts have been extensively perceived as existentially endangering something and have made it into the security agenda, they translate into security policy. As this argument implies, the process of securitization is mostly a domestic political choice. It is the combination of both facts and successful spreading of perceptions of threat that makes up security and becomes security policy the definition of security as socially constructed implies that it is not simply about a subjective perception of threats; it is not a matter that individuals decide alone, but rather has an intersubjective character. Consequently, the actual content of the concept of security is built up by the securitizing actor in a delicate bargaining process with the legitimizing audience on the grounds of facts.

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Trans-boundary water can be considered as a natural resource that can be easily securitized under the effect of new international politics and climate politics. According to Fischhendler (8) there are two types of security; 'strategic security', associated with the hydrology of an international river basin that links all the riparian states in a complex network of environmental, economic and political interdependencies. In cases such as these, water is often elevated to a 'national security' status - a matter of life and death. The Nile water negotiations are a case in point. The second type of securitization, Mishandle (8) calls 'tactical securitization'. This takes place when 'low politics' issues, such as water, are linked with the 'high politics' issues of national survival, for example, the 1994 treaty between Jordan and Israel. Once securitization has taken place, extraordinary measures to neutralize the threat are often legitimized (8). By placing issues beyond the realm of normal politics, securitization constitutes a breach of regular political processes (26). But how is an issue, in this case water, securitized?

Water is securitized through three main mechanisms known as structural, institutional and linguistic. Structural mechanisms are physical infrastructures that serve to protect the resource given its importance to society². (8) However, structural mechanisms would not be justifiable without the institutional mechanisms that implement them. Institutional mechanisms may include having military representatives or foreign affairs officials in basin authorities. Finally, the centrality of language in recognizing and portraying an issue as a threat and invoking a sense of urgency, is called by Fischhendler 'linguistic securitization'. It includes metaphors, framings and narratives. Perhaps the most common metaphor is that of 'water conflict' (8).

3.1. Is international influence of the UNESCO, UN, EU, NATO, WB, WTO diminishing?

Trump's America first policy threatens to upset the global trading system and even put the WTO in danger. This will naturally precipitate reactions from other global players, and in particular the EU and China. The EU has a strong economic and political interest in preventing the demise of the multilateral trading system(17).

The European Union remains unsure about its role in the world, not least in terms of its security and its ability to do new trade and security deals. Brexit will diminish the EU's size and possibly its trade and security influence.

Finally, the EU remains a weaker player than its size suggests, not only because of its internal divisions but also because of its dependence on the security guarantee that the US provides and its dependence on energy imports.

President Donald Trump is expected to push for deep cuts in US foreign aid including UN budget in his initial budget proposal. US was not just the driver behind the founding of the UN, but it is also the organization's biggest individual contributor - which gives the US

² For example, potential threats to water systems could target infrastructures, making water systems vulnerable to terrorist attacks such as deliberate contamination. As such, a number of structural mechanisms are put in place to securitise these water systems, such as the setting up of demilitarised zones around water systems and installing early warning systems(7).

big sway in what's happening there. This US deep cuts will also influence UNESCO Works related with transboundary water and hydro diplomacy.

US President Trump has previously been hugely critical of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), a cornerstone of American foreign policy for more than 60 years. He attacked the organization as "obsolete" and characterized its members as ungrateful allies who benefit from US largesse.

Defense Secretary James Mattis warned Nato members in February that Washington would "moderate its commitment" if members did not meet his boss's demand that they raise their defense spending to 2% of their GDP. Mr Trump claimed his tough talk was causing the "money to pour in", although analysts point out that countries were already increasing their contributions under a 2014 agreement.

Although President Trump had a change of heart and said Nato was "no longer obsolete", his first approach has already put the NATO influence in question.

President Donald Trump plans to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, multiple outlets reported recently. This would make the United States one of just three countries outside the historic pact to reduce planet-warming emission.

Since the second world war, the US has played a clear leadership role in building, supporting and policing the global system. This sense of responsibility for maintaining the world order was supported by a view that it was beneficial to the US.

3.2. Re- securitization in context

In this study Re-securitization used as the rethinking of securitized issues and deciding to put them into securities once again, such that the securities created at the second stage represent a further securitization of securities initially created as a result of securitization.

In this article, we have argued that some countries may performs for re- securitization of some issues in response to new international relations and new global political situation. For instance, Russian action in Ukraine, the Alliance has translated successfully a securitizing move evident in discourse into concrete policy measures.

Theoretically speaking, the re-securitization has often been seen as content to describe the process of securitization rather than explain it. Our argument has been to ask 'how' re-securitization can bring sustainable solution in transboundary water issues and food security where climate change impacts are still matter.

Another point is "what" constitutes to protect de-securitization in conflicted areas. Therefore the reasons for desecuritizations and driving force of resecuritisation are worthwhile to study on the base of new international relationship and climate change effects.

It is evident that emerging climate change impacts and conflicted transboundary water management issues will need more collaborative approach than that of non-effective cooperation acts, let alone re-securitization of the transboundary issues.

3.3. The (re)securitizing move

Some experts say, “the multipolar world order proved to be a total failure in maintaining global peace”. Climate change causing several problems such as sea-level rise, drought, water shortage, flood has been considered as one of the main security risks in near future. This may lead re-securitization of the water resources especially in water short regions. The rationale is that emerging national states interest in New World Order may cause re-securitization of the water resources causing tensions and even violent conflict in some regions of the World.

Through the lens of climate change politics and re-securitization theory, it seems that water-short regions of the World is likely to meet the political consequences of such security framing strategy. New emerging national security framings and their connection with transboundary water and climate change adverse effects is likely to create new conflicts in water -short regions.

Under these circumstances, it should be noted that especially transboundary water issues may securities and it may become a political tool in international politics. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine how and why such a strategy has emerged, and most importantly, to what extent de-securitization of water resources has been successful

3.4. The water de-securitization nexus

Another aspect of securitization, and the other side of the same coin, is *DE securitization*, or when a securitized issue is moved from the security sphere back to so-called normal politics (32).

The brief definition by Buzan et al. states that desecuritization involves ‘the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’ (39). Yet more could be said; it implies that issues

for which the potential use of force had been legitimized before, now start to retrace their steps taking the opposite direction, whereby violence ceases to be a legitimate option (37).

Although many claim that the concept of DE securitization is underdeveloped and underspecified (33), there is a growing field of studies that try to probe the securitization–desecuritization dynamic with regard to different empirical issue areas such as minority rights or ex-combatants in post–civil war settings (34,35).

In the late 1990s, there was a discursive turn in the policy framing of water, which countered the **water-war** thesis and strengthened the water-for-peace discourse. It was now argued that water scarcity was triggering cooperation rather than war. Thus, cooperation held the prospect for peace (5) and was proved by extensive historical analysis(6).

Since then, studies suggest technological and diplomatic advances, which would make cooperation a much more likely outcome of water scarcity (15, 25).

Hence, the water sector became increasingly viewed as a strategic area where cooperation was more likely to flourish between former adversaries than other issue areas. It also provided a suitable rationale for water development to become part of the liberal peacebuilding agenda in its overarching effort to strengthen institution building and state capacity. Shared functional interests in scarce water resources and technological innovations were expected to trigger and catalyse cooperation, which would create confidence and trust between warring parties. In addition, there was a tendency to overdramatize the potential dangers and risks of failing to

take preventive actions in relation to water scarcity in order to mobilise and encourage investments in water development and infrastructure, such as pipelines, desalination plants, wastewater treatment and drip irrigation systems to mention a few (5).

These ideas were influenced by assumptions emanating from functionalist theory (27). The theory prescribes and expects cooperation in areas of low politics to spillover to high politics and ultimately result in integration. As Mac Ginty underlines (30), “[a] strong logic of technocracy is to expand its area of functional competency and to make linkages with other areas of technocracy. Technocrats find it convenient to deal with technocrats.” Such a policy assumption was, for instance, reflected in the initial phases of the Middle East Peace Process where water was a prioritized area within the multilateral negotiations, aiming to foster long-term regional cooperation and sustainable peace (28,29).

As the water peace discourse dominated among practitioners and diplomats, the water sector became a favored area for donor assistance. Hydro-cooperative projects between Israelis and Palestinians were initiated and received generous funding. Many technical projects such as irrigation systems, pipelines and wastewater plants were launched and funded in Palestine to develop additional and new water supplies (36).



Yet, in contrast to other regions where water resides in the area of low politics, water in the Middle East is securitized and thereby defies some of the preconditions for functional water cooperation. This may therefore result in unintended peacebuilding consequences.

A region frequently mentioned in this context is the Middle East as it suffers from volatile politics, unfavourable demographic trends, droughts and limited quantities of freshwater (3). Climate change has added to the severity of the problem by increasing uncertainty while predicting rising temperature and decreased precipitation, which will intensify evaporation of surface water while slowing down the renewal of groundwater. This is assumed to have dire consequences on economic growth, social stability and food security (4).

A move towards ‘de-securitizing’ Egypt’s water conflict with Ethiopia or whether it is an attempt to ‘contain’ the emerging Ethiopian power, is not yet clear.

3.5. Water Resources as a national security issue.

Water resources have been identified as a national security issue in many international river basins in Southern Africa, e.g. the Okavango River basin (12), in the Tigris and Euphrates basin (13), in the Nile basin (14) and in the Mountain Aquifer shared between Israel and Palestine (15). These trans-boundary rivers are often described in terms of scarcity and embedded in concerns over 'water wars'.

4.THE NEW MIDDLE EAST CASE

The term "New Middle East" was introduced to the world in June 2006 in Tel Aviv by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (who was credited by the Western media for coining the term) in replacement of the older and more imposing term, the "Greater Middle East."

The term and conceptualization of the "New Middle East," was subsequently heralded by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Israeli Prime Minister at the height of the Anglo-American sponsored Israeli siege of Lebanon. Prime Minister Olmert and Secretary Rice had informed the international media that a project for a "New Middle East" was being launched from Lebanon.

According to Nasiriya (38)" *The Middle East, in some regards, is a striking parallel to the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe during the years leading up the First World War. In the wake of the the First World War the borders of the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe were redrawn. This region experienced a period of upheaval, violence and conflict, before and after World War I, which was the direct result of foreign economic interests and interference.*"


11 years ago, from now, Nazemroaya has explained that *"This announcement was a confirmation of an Anglo-American-Israeli "military roadmap" in the Middle East. This project, which has been in the planning stages for several years, consists in creating an arc of instability, chaos, and violence extending from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Iran, and the borders of NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan."*

He also stated in his article (38) that *"The "New Middle East" project was introduced publicly by Washington and Tel Aviv with the expectation that Lebanon would be the pressure point for realigning the whole Middle East and thereby unleashing the forces of "constructive chaos." This "constructive chaos" –which generates conditions of violence and warfare throughout the region– would in turn be used so that the United States, Britain, and Israel could redraw the map of the Middle East in accordance with their geo-strategic needs and objectives."*

Although it is extremely important that security, stability and development through political dialogs and negotiations set up between regional states, upcoming collapse of Syria after six-year civil war, almost divided Iraq and newly emerging Qatar crises indicates that these dialogs and negotiations will be delayed for a certain period of time as usual in the region.

The results of constructive chaos and new announcement of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq about independence referendum date as Sept 25, 2017, parliamentary elections date as Nov 6, 2017 show that as a first stage, redrawing the map of the Middle East mission has already been completed. But second and third stage of the mission to set up a temporary balance in an imbalance seems to be very difficult and take a long time.

During these stages, re-securitized resource politics (water and oil) seems to play very important role for the future of the new Middle East.



Therefore, in this section we will attempt to touch upon some of the issues involved so as to shed light on the various ways water has been securitized in the region.

It is worthwhile to examine the re-securitization in the Tigris-Euphrates River basin and the Orontes River basin. Given the arid or semi-arid nature of the region, the very survival of the states in question is dependent on their having access to these rivers.

In these cases, competition for water among the riparian states is aggravated by political conflicts.

Water was and remains a highly securitized issue in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Both Syria and Iraq had resorted over the decades to various securitization mechanisms with regards to their water conflict with Turkey, whereas the latter mostly resorted to ‘contain’ these securitization moves via the use of ‘soft power’. However, in January 1990 Turkey mobilized its forces when it cut the Euphrates to fill the Atatürk Dam, reducing the flow of water into Syria and Iraq by 75 percent. Iraq had threatened to bomb the dam, which led Turkey to threaten to cut off the water flow to Syria and Iraq completely.

Both Syria and Iraq resorted occasionally to strategic securitization through framing their conflict over water in terms of regional security and thereby mobilizing regional and international support for their cause. Moreover, Syria resorted to tactical securitization by linking low politics issues (water) with high politics (the Kurdish issue) (7).

However, the “High Politics” of the region has discouraged cooperation and collaboration between the parties in the region and transboundary water politics among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq improved markedly in the first decade of the 2000s (9). In 2005, a track-two initiative (the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC)) was set up, and in 2008, the co-riparians agreed to create a joint water institute. In 2009, Syria and Turkey also agreed to build a joint dam on the Orontes River, another transboundary watercourse in the region. Although this so-called ‘Friendship Dam’ has been described as ‘a breakthrough in Turkish-Syrian hydro politics’ (9), no tangible achievements were realized. In 2009 a ‘crisis summit’ was held in Ankara to discuss the water issues and the drought that hit the region.

Israel and Palestine both link their respective highest-order goals; security and national rights, with unfettered allocation of water. Securitization of water resource management; linking water issues to national security concerns, dominates long-term planning in Israel and is the foundation of Palestinian national aspirations.

4.1. New Middle East, New Conflicts, New Water Equation

The transboundary water problems in the Middle East is not limited to water quantity and quality anymore. It is prone to intricately intertwined into the political fabric of the region

Much has been written about the most secure and economic route of the oil and natural gas pipelines and, while it has not been another vital natural resource can be securitized easily under the effect of political and natural climate change in the New Middle East. As it is well known, transboundary water sources have constantly been part of the discussion among military and political strategists in the Middle East.

New Middle East and Climate Change will force to set up a new water equation for this water short region. The region is largely arid or semi-arid with precipitation rates of 250 mm/annually in most of the region compounded by extremely high evapotranspiration rates ranging from 1700-2300 mm/annually. Finally, the spatial considerations of water distribution and lack of holding capacity, in conjunction with high population rates, exacerbate the crisis.

4.2. Transboundary Groundwater

There are few precedents in international law relating to trans-boundary groundwater management.

While the Helsinki treaty of 1966 prescribed (in a nonbinding fashion) a doctrine of ‘hydrologic unity’, i.e., users need to be reasonable and equitable when drawing groundwater, the Bellagio treaty of 1989 provided some guidelines to protect groundwater from excessive ‘drawdown’ and the Harmon Doctrine provided for some measure of water ‘rights’, for the most part, the vast history of legal decisions regarding water management relate to surface water. Moreover, most of, many of legal renderings deal with water ‘needs’ and not ‘rights’. (6).

Transboundary groundwater issues in the new Middle East will also likely to be a more conflicted than before

5.CONCLUSION REMARKS

This paper first reviews possible effects of the natural climate changing trends together with consequences of the new world political changing trends on trans boundary rivers hydro-politics in post conflicted regions.

It seems to be worthwhile to synthesize emerging more national interest based new international relationships effects on transboundary water issues within the context of countries' policy goals.

The potential unifying power that a trans-boundary water resource provides to increase the sharing of benefits, deepen dialogue, and thereby assist in economic (environmental and security) development. Especially in the conflicted regions in the world, water resource management is an indirect variable of the peace process; albeit a critical vector with a great deal of potential for “spill over”. Water resource management, on the other hand, is a direct and vital variable for economic sustainability.

In her article (37)Oelsner highlighted that mutual trust and confidence as central elements in stable regional relations. The emergence of trust and confidence amongst states marks the transformation of zones of *negative peace* into zones of *positive peace*. Moreover, if civil societies are so closely interconnected that in addition to their national identities some kind of regional identification emerges, then that zone of *stable peace* has also become a *pluralistic security community*.

Desecuritization encourage improvements in the quality of regional peace. Nonetheless, it is also thinkable that regional peace stabilisation—as the result of the mere passage of time without armed confrontations; that is the transformation from fragile into unstable peace—may slowly encourage domestic desecuritization (37). Opposite to this approach

The process peace stabilization and consolidation is demanding, fragile, easily reversible, and needs a great deal of political will. In contrast, securitization and destabilization of peace are a likely outcome in the anarchic context, particularly in the case of former adversaries.

But, While the World is moving towards a new world order and national interests of the countries are gaining momentum, re-securitization of the water resources especially in a politically new designed region like Middle East wouldn't be so much surprising issue.

In the New Middle East, a major obstacle to reach an agreement on this on-going water conflict would be ‘national security’. The new states or federal states or cantonal new entities in the new Middle East will try to justify their water policies by linking ‘water security’ with ‘national security’. This attempt could bring the re-securitization of the water to the region in a new form causing new conflicts in the region.

Hence, it seems reasonable to claim that (de)securitization and regional peace is closely interlinked. Therefore, it is wise to defend to de-securitize to water resources in conflicted regions with the help of participation and involvement of the national and international civil society and related organizations.

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